10 The Future Won't Be Pretty

The Nature and Value of Ugly, AI-Designed Experiments

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Can an ugly experiment be a good experiment? Philosophers have identified many beautiful experiments and explored ways in which their beauty might be connected to their epistemic value. However, in this chapter, I seek out (and celebrate) ugly experiments. Which experiments are those? For hardcore theoreticians, perhaps *all* experiments are ugly, and only pure theory can be beautiful. For others, "ugly" experiments will be shorthand for "bad" experiments, similarly to how "beautiful" can be shorthand for "good" (Todd 2008). To avoid these ambiguities, this chapter will focus on distinctly *aesthetic* ugliness in scientific experiments to consider what, if anything, the relationship might be between this and epistemic value, and specifically, whether aesthetic ugliness can ever be epistemically good.

10.1 Introduction

There are at least two things we should be clear about when evaluating experiments. The first is to specify which *aspect* of an experiment we want to evaluate. Aspects of experiments include the instruments, the results, the objects, the hypothesis being tested, the performance, the interpretation, and the design. Following a number of authors, I will focus on evaluations of the *design* of experiments (Parsons and Rueger 2000; Murphy 2020; Ivanova 2021, 2022). This is because it is the design that defines the experiment. In many cases, we can use the same experimental design to test different hypotheses related to different objects, get different results, interpret the same results differently, and swap in different instruments. But we cannot alter the central features of an experiment's design without creating a new experiment.

The second thing to be clear about is the sense of goodness at issue. An experimental design can be *ethically* good, for example, when it does not irresponsibly risk harm, or when it aligns with the ethical values of those who stand to profit or be harmed by the outcomes. The design of an experiment can also be *epistemically* good, such that it is likely to produce a high signal-to-noise ratio, eliminates possible confounds, or is easy to

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replicate. Finally, the design of an experiment can be *aesthetically* good, such that its design is elegant, clear, simple, symmetrical, or beautiful.

These distinctions gloss over a difficult axiological question: are ethical, epistemic, and aesthetic values merely different manifestations of a single, maximally general kind of goodness (like the Platonic form of the Good), or are they indeed fundamentally different kinds of goodness? While interesting, we will leave this aside to ask the more applied question concerning how far these different senses of goodness can come apart in the case of experimental design in science. This question is meaningful independently of whether the different kinds of goodness are manifestations of a more general good.

One way to begin answering this question is to look at examples. John Horgan (2012) collects some of 'science's ugliest experiments', including the Castle Bravo atomic bomb test in 1954, syphilis trials in Guatemala in the mid-1940s, and using electrical brain stimulation to "treat" homosexuality between 1949 and 1980. Some of these experiments were ugly in the sense of being ethically bad, while others were epistemically bad, and some were both. However, it seems that an experiment's design can be ethically good while being epistemically bad. Consider members of institutional *ethics* review boards, who do not need to care whether an experiment's design has a high likelihood of producing a result with *epistemic* value. That is not their job. And going in the other direction, we note that there are experimental designs that would accurately reveal causal dependencies in a system (this is one way to be epistemically good) while causing harm to humans. The Castle Bravo experiment might be an example of this.

Likewise, aesthetically beautiful designs can be ethically bad. For example, imagine a very clear and simple design that tests the effect of some poisonous substance on humans. Going in the other direction, we can also imagine ethically flawless experiments that are convoluted, needlessly complicated, inelegant, and so on.

This brings us to the relation between aesthetic and epistemic goods in experimental design, which is the focus of this chapter. Let's put a few options on the table. It might be that aesthetic values are completely independent of epistemic values, at least when it comes to experimental design, such that having one kind of value tells us absolutely nothing about whether the design has the other kind of value. Alternatively, one kind of value might be *sufficient* for the other, such that possessing one kind of value automatically tells us that an experiment has some value of the other kind. Another possibility is that one of these values is *necessary* for the other. For example, perhaps an experiment's design can't be beautiful if it's not likely to tell us something new about the world, or a design can't be epistemically good if it's not at least *somewhat* clear, simple, elegant, and so on. Another possibility is that there is no general connection between beauty and epistemic value, but there is/are connections between *certain* aesthetic properties and *certain* epistemic properties. For example, perhaps symmetry is tied to robustness, but not to having a good signal-to-noise ratio. A final possibility is that increasing one kind of value might generally *tend* to increase the other kind of value, without guaranteeing or requiring it.

To conserve space, we will focus only on the one-way inference from aesthetic value to epistemic value. This is perhaps the more interesting direction of inference, as it inspires strong and polarising intuitions. Consider, for example, the statement made by Roger Penrose quoted by James McAllister: 'something which looks attractive may have a better chance of being true than something which looks ugly... So often, in fact, it turns out that the more attractive possibility is the true one' (McAllister 1996, 90–91). Some will find this tantalising while others will find it simply wrong.

We will also restrict ourselves to particular and technical notions of aesthetic and epistemic values. Roughly, by epistemic value I mean something like "internal validity", that is, the ability of a design to reliably, replicably, and robustly identify the (causal) effect of one variable on (an)other(s) (Campbell 1957; Guala 2003, 2005; Hogarth 2005; Jimenez-Buedo and Miller 2010). And by aesthetic value, I mean something like a positive, pleasurable feeling resulting from first-hand (intellectual, imaginary, or perceptual) experience (Schellekens 2022). Other forms of epistemic and aesthetic value (including understanding as a kind of epistemic value and the sorts of aesthetic values more *en vogue* in modern discussions of art) will also be discussed, though these will not be the main focus. Finally, I will mostly be concerned with aesthetic and epistemic values in general rather than the properties that are referred to in justifying aesthetic and epistemic judgements (e.g., simplicity, clarity, signal-to-noise ratio, etc.) since it would be impossible in one chapter to address all the relationships between all the properties. In sum, here are the options.

1 *Independence*: the positive or negative aesthetic value of an experimental design tells us nothing about its epistemic value.
2 *Proportionality*: increasing the aesthetic value of an experiment's design generally tends to increase its epistemic value.
3 *Necessity*: if an experiment's design has epistemic value, it has aesthetic value.
4 *Sufficiency*: if an experiment's design has aesthetic value, then it has epistemic value.
5 *Necessity and sufficiency*: an experimental design has epistemic value if and only if it has aesthetic value.

Which of these is the correct way to understand the relationship between aesthetic and epistemic value? In the next section, I will present a case study that takes the last three options off the table, leaving only the first and a specific, weakened reading of the second. This may be surprising, since most of the work on the aesthetics of experiments focuses on the beautiful (not the ugly), and it is easy to get the impression from the literature that the connection is quite strong. On the other hand, some readers will already be convinced that there is no (strong) aesthetic-epistemic relationship. In that case, my contribution is to provide new evidence for that intuition.

My argument begins by noting that AI is currently designing experiments. These AI-designed experiments are here to stay, and one day they might represent the majority of experiments in science. (This is important because if AI-designed experiments were just an oddity, we would be tempted to exclude them from any discussion of the aesthetics of experiments). These experiments are ugly, and the nature of the algorithms that produce them helps to explain *both* their ugliness *and* their epistemic value.

10.2 AI-Designed Experiments

In the mid-1960s, the success of thinking machines and "analytic engines" in certain computational tasks soon led to the idea of creating a robot scientist. Herbert Simon's thinking machine, the Logic Theorist, combined with the new Information Processing Language, inspired researchers like Edward Feigenbaum to create discovery programs that were applied in the DENDRAL project, whose purpose was to automate mass spectrometry experiments for the Viking landers, which would test for amino acids on Mars (Lindsay et al. 1993; Feigenbaum 2007). This idea was scrapped because of the energy and weight constraints of extraterrestrial robotics, but it was taken up elsewhere in chemistry, for example, by a program called FAHRENHEIT whose purpose was to perform experiments, analyse data, look for errors, determine replicability, and create new theoretical hypotheses, all in the service of (among other things) detecting low-concentration ions (Żytkow 1987; Żytkow et al. 1990).

In the early 2000s, Ross King oversaw the creation of several robot scientists. These were "closed-loop" systems, in the sense that they designed, performed, and interpreted experiments, and then fed what they found back into the system to inspire new experiments, and so on until a solution was produced. The first of these, Adam (2004–2011), worked on functional genomics in yeast, performing gene knock-out experiments (King et al. 2004). Initially, it found the functions of genes that were already known. Then it discovered genes responsible for the production of important amino acids, which were not known. These discoveries were checked manually, and Adam was correct. King claims this is the first robot scientist to generate completely novel scientific knowledge. His next project, Eve (2008–2020), focused on neglected tropical diseases, identifying compounds that might be useful in producing cheap and effective treatments (Williams et al. 2015). Eve was also recently used to test the replicability of studies in cancer research (Roper et al. 2022). A new project, Genesis, is now deployed in the context of systems biology, and it is advertised as being able to perform up to 10,000 closed-loop cycles of experiments at a time.

One admitted shortcoming of these prototype projects is that human intervention is often required, and the experiments are relatively conservative variants of existing designs. However, recent work by Mario Krenn and colleagues has produced an algorithm ("MELVIN") that designs experiments that no one has ever thought of before. More specifically, Krenn's team could not come up with a viable design for a certain type of experiment, and the algorithm succeeded where the humans couldn't in suggesting a way to arrange laboratory equipment such that certain quantum phenomena could be produced and manipulated in the lab. As Krenn et al. point out, AI is already being used in a number of ways relating to the design of experiments in accelerator physics, plasma physics, nanophotonics, quantum circuits, and superconduction (Krenn et al. 2020), but using AI to design new experiments from scratch is only now gaining ground.

Krenn's lab wanted to produce a certain type of quantum entangled system. The most common type of entanglement (the "qubit") obtains between two particles and two states (e.g., spin up and spin down). Higher-dimensional entanglement occurs when we have more than two particles and/or more than two states. This kind of entanglement is potentially very important for quantum computing, as it has greater information-carrying capacity. Trying to produce and manipulate certain types of higher-dimensional entanglement had proven 'difficult' (Erhard et al. 2020): Krenn reports trying with colleagues for several weeks without success to produce a particular form of multiparticle entangled state (Krenn 2021). The algorithm MELVIN was developed, and it produced an experiment that was 'the first genuine high-dimensional multiparticle entanglement' (ibid), using crystals to produce photon pairs. This discovery (Erhard et al. 2018) enabled independent manipulation of the quantum states, invented new tools for quantum experiments, and has now been expanded for use with non-photonic systems.

Roughly, the algorithm possesses a 'toolbox' filled with representations of optical laboratory components, which it combines randomly. The combinations are tested for viability, and those that pass are then tested in more detail. Even if a set-up is not viable, it might produce a new type of tool, which is then added to the toolbox. The final set-up that MELVIN recommended required the use of tools that it conceptualized on its own. Experiments are represented mathematically as graphs, with vertices representing photon paths and edges representing amplitude by their weights and quantum properties by their colours. The successful outcome is then simplified by an XAI algorithm that eliminates redundant elements so that humans can understand it well enough to implement it.

AI-designed experiments still make up a minority of all scientific experiments performed, but there are reasons to think that this will change. Frank Wilczek, who won the Nobel Prize in physics in 2004, has claimed that in 100 years the best physicist might be a machine (2016). The Nobel Turing Challenge is a competition to produce a Nobel-winning AI scientist by 2050 (Kitano 2021). Ross King argues that we should expect the use of AI to expand in science because it is reliable when it comes to memory and mathematics, it can process more data more quickly than humans can, and it can find patterns that are invisible to humans. He points out that AI is very good at anything that can be gamified, and quite a bit of science can be gamified. AI tends to be cheaper, faster, more accurate, more detailed, and it can be scaled up and controlled remotely (King 2021).

We therefore have good reason to believe that "experimental design" should not only refer to human-designed experiments, but experiments designed either by humans, by human-AI teams, or by AI themselves.

10.3 The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

In *Scientific American*, Aephraim Steinberg comments that the experiment designed by MELVIN is 'a *gorgeous* first example of the kind of new explorations these thinking machines can take us on' (Ananthaswamy 2021; emphasis added). Steinberg did not work on these experiments, but he uses AI to design experiments of his own. I reached out to Steinberg, and the quotations that follow come from our conversation, which took place over a few weeks in 2021.

So, what did Steinberg mean when he said that the experiment was gorgeous? He recognised that scientists 'use anthropomorphic terms like "beautiful" and even "sexy" in vague and ill-defined ways all the time', but this was not what he was doing in this case. 'There was something… lip-smacking, entrancing…about this implementation, particularly to experimentalists. Not that it's the most important, the most creative, or the most elegant experiment ever, but…to my eye, at least, there's a 'rhythm' and 'cadence' to the series of interferometers in their experimental setup which indeed looks almost poetic or artistic'. He goes on, 'I think it was the combination of the experimental prowess and elegance, with the fact of implementing the 'clever' scheme from the AI-invented protocol which pushed me to describe it the way I did…I liked this example because I thought they really did demonstrate that they could do something that as far as I know, no humans had figured out how to do before'. In sum, Steinberg's notion of a beautiful experiment involves newness, surprisingness, simplicity of design (i.e., elegance as opposed to arcaneness), looking good (either in the pdf or physically on the tabletop), and having good rhythm or cadence in the performance (whether that performance is imagined or physical).

This matches quite closely what philosophers have said about beautiful experiments in the past. Glenn Parsons and Alexander Rueger focus on the aptness of a design, the simplicity of its steps, and the imagination of its designer (2000). Milena Ivanova focuses on the elegance, simplicity, and clarity of a design (Ivanova 2022). Steinberg agrees with these and adds rhythm or cadence, which is a nice addition to the set. Grouping together these properties, we have something consistent with what Elisabeth Schellekens calls the 'standard conception' of aesthetic value. For Schellekens, the standard conception is the classic, traditional one, which develops from the following two axioms: (a) aesthetic experience is grounded in first-hand perception, and (b) aesthetic experience is characterised by pleasure (Schellekens 2022, 125). In our case, we should expand the first axiom so that it refers to *experience* rather than perception, since experimental designs are sometimes imagined or contemplated rather than literally perceived (call this expanded version the "standard+" conception of aesthetic value). Then, a beautiful experiment is one whose design is experienced first-hand, where that experience is a pleasurable one. That pleasure will be tied to experiences of particular aspects of the design, like its aptness, clarity, rhythm, etc.

As Schellekens points out, the history of aesthetics is a history of expanding this standard conception to include many different kinds, sources, and media for aesthetic value. But these various kinds of modern and post-modern aesthetic values are not what is at issue in discussions of the aesthetics of science. Scientists and philosophers are not concerned with whether an experiment can have aesthetic value in the same sense as the art of Duchamp, Picasso, Rothko, Pollock, John Cage, or Ai Weiwei. Perhaps they should be, but they're not. Therefore, in what follows, by "beauty" we will refer to the most general standard+ aesthetic value and by "ugly" we will refer to the lack of such value.[1]

On the standard+ conception of aesthetic value, is MELVIN's experiment beautiful? It might seem so, from what Steinberg said above. However, in an interesting turn of conversation that inspired this chapter, Steinberg focused directly on the aesthetic properties of the experiment and in so doing, began to suggest a different view. He went on, 'the part of the experiment the AI designed is probably less elegant than many of the simple setups humans have designed for various experiments along the way'. At this point, he begins to separate the contribution of the AI from the contribution of the humans. 'When I talk about the "experiment," I mean this chip the group put together, and… the computer didn't tell them how to do that'. This is important, as it recognises a general feature of many modern AI designs. Whether AI is used in designing an experiment, a chair, a car, a building, or something else, many of the features that humans find aesthetically pleasing are those added by the humans who chose, developed, and implemented the design.

Further, 'if the solution is elegant, it's not so hard for people to stumble upon, while if it's arcane, it may be harder for us to discover'. In other words, when the experimental design is 'nice and elegant', we don't need the AI, because 'people would have gotten around to inventing it if they'd had much reason to'. This is important because it reminds us that the experiments we need AIs to design won't usually be ones with clear, simple, elegant solutions. They'll be the arcane, ugly ones.

Steinberg portrays the general situation like this,

> With genetic algorithms, or other optimization techniques, they've been able to develop remarkable pulse sequences for controlling quantum systems. And usually, they just look like a godawful mess that happens to work… In some cases, you could squint your eyes and say 'oh! it's just trying to do [some technique we already knew about],' and it would all make sense. And it would turn out that all the 'mess' was just 'noise,' and if a human had designed it, it would have been 'prettier' (simpler, cleaner), but worked just as well. I believe by now there are cases where this isn't true, and we don't know of 'clean' optimal solutions, so have only the computers.

To illustrate this point, Steinberg referred to some work of his own (Figure 10.1).



Figure 10.1 An example of an "ugly" use of AI in a quantum experiment (reproduced with permission from Zhuang et al. 2013). The original caption reads: 'GRAPE pulse and a similar AM vs. PM pulse. (a) GRAPE pulse and the corresponding simulation results with the lattice Hamiltonian without gravity. (b) A similar AM vs. PM pulse has the same pulse duration and the variance as the GRAPE pulse and the corresponding simulation results with the lattice Hamiltonian without gravity'.

Steinberg explains that the figure

> Shows two clean sinusoids (in the upper right) which implement a technique that makes physical sense to us, and which we intentionally tried on our atoms; 'GRAPE' (which is a computer optimisation technique) invented its own optimum, shown on the upper left, and you can see that it seems to have more or less discovered the same idea. But if you look at the bottom panels, which show (in simulations) the effectiveness of the techniques (which are meant to bring the line for P_1 as high as possible by the end of the pulse, and the other two [P_0 and P_L] as low as possible), it looks like the GRAPE pulse – at first glance just a 'messier' version of our designed pulse – actually does better. And we don't know anything about why this 'uglier' pulse works better. We also don't know how much you could 'clean it up' and still have it work well.

In the end, experiencing MELVIN's experimental design (on the page or in the imagination) caused pleasure, which earned it the label 'gorgeous' on the standard+ conception of aesthetic value. But on closer inspection, when we isolate the aspects of the design that were created by the AI before it had been cleaned up and implemented by the humans, it is more likely to look like a 'godawful mess'. And this will be true for experiments designed by AI in general. It is not impossible that we could design algorithms that produce beautiful experiments in the standard+ sense. However, the point is that scientists are not motivated to do this. Why would they be? In science, we often need a way to control or manipulate systems that have a great deal of variables and/or display some chaotic behaviour, and it is in these contexts that AI will be most valuable. In such contexts, we should not expect AI designs to be beautiful, that is, simple, clear, elegant, and with a satisfying rhythm or cadence. This is because AI algorithms typically employ deep neural networks and machine learning, which consist in brute force exploration of all the options in a preselected set (or set of sets) of potential solutions in a problem space, or they alter node weights (i.e., numbers by which to multiply numerical inputs) that were randomly assigned and then adjusted until a certain level of performance is reached, defined in terms of finding a desired local minimum (i.e., a "solution"). Their power comes almost entirely from calculation speed. There is nothing in the code that tells the AI to prefer solutions that produce pleasure in humans, and that is a good thing, because it would limit the set of solutions the AI would consider. We use AI precisely because it is not limited in the same ways that humans are. It finds solutions that aren't the ones that we would look for because its "processing fluency" is completely different from ours. Humans find pleasure in simple, clear, elegant designs, because that is what we like to process, because it is easy to process. AI transcends those limitations. This explains why we are seeing AI used in certain parts of science and not others. Where there are many variables, heaps of data, and we need subtle, complex solutions, scientists will increasingly turn to AI.

Note that the nature and value of AI designs is similar, both aesthetically and epistemically, to AI proofs in mathematics. Viktor Blåsjö argues that 'an ugly proof resorts to computations, algorithms, symbolic manipulation, ad hoc steps, trial-and-error, enumeration of cases, and various other forms of technicalities. The mind can neither predict the course nor grasp the whole; it is forced to cope with extra-cognitive contingencies' (2018). Similarly, Alan Cain writes about computer-assisted proofs in which 'readers cannot see why this construction or this calculation or that definition is being carried out; they cannot perceive a reason for it that is internal to the proof…the deus is a cataract that their intuition cannot easily navigate' (2010). Cain is inspired by G. H. Hardy's view of mathematical beauty as unexpected inevitability, which a computer-assisted proof does not provide. Ulianov Montano takes this view further by comparing mathematical proofs to narratives, which should have a satisfying plot to be beautiful. Montano claims that 'the experience [of studying a computer-assisted proof] has deforming narrative gaps. A computer-assisted proof shall always give us an incomplete experience, something we cannot fully appreciate, despite the fact that the proof is a perfectly acceptable and widespread method. Thus, it is not very plausible that we shall come to regard computer-assisted proofs as beautiful' (2014, 203). These quotations all have in common the idea that the products of digital methods in mathematics are ugly, and for the same reason: their outputs are ad hoc, they use brute force, and they are disfluent to the human mind. But as Montano notes, these methods are 'perfectly acceptable' and becoming widespread. In the case of the computer proof of the four-colour theorem, Montano argues that it was never really questioned by mathematicians *as a proof*. 'The issue here is not whether the proof is genuine or not, but rather that it is ugly. The ugliness of the proof is thus not explained by mathematicians' epistemic or other technical concerns' (37). The ugliness we experience is similar to watching a movie with a complicated plot that suddenly stops and reports that the main characters lived happily ever after, while refusing to explain anything more. 'The assistance of the computer impairs, or rather wrecks, the proof's storytelling' (2014, 37). A similar claim can be made concerning AI-created experimental designs: what is expected but missing are the rhythm, cadence, narrative arc, underlying coherence, and the feeling that you are in the competent hands of an expert storyteller. All of this contributes to a feeling of ugliness.

I conclude that AI-designed experiments can be both ugly and epistemically good (again, where "epistemically good" refers to something like internal validity). This ugliness is characteristic of AI use in science. Given that AI plays ever greater roles in science, we can expect more ugly experimental designs in science. Of course, what makes AI-designed experiments ugly is nothing new: many experiments in science can be found that will be arcane and without a satisfying rhythm in very similar ways. But the case with AI experiments is especially clear, so I will continue to draw upon it in what follows.

10.4 When Uglier Is Better

As a reminder, here are the options we outlined at the beginning for possible relations between aesthetic and epistemic value.

1. *Independence*: the positive or negative aesthetic value of an experimental design tells us nothing about its epistemic value.
2. *Proportionality*: increasing the aesthetic value of an experiment's design generally tends to increase its epistemic value.
3. *Necessity*: if an experiment's design has epistemic value, it has aesthetic value.
4. *Sufficiency*: if an experiment's design has aesthetic value, then it has epistemic value.
5. *Necessity and sufficiency*: an experimental design has epistemic value if and only if it has aesthetic value.

We don't need to say much about sufficiency, because no one claims that simplicity or clarity (etc.) on their own guarantee epistemic value. But there are good reasons to think that beauty is *necessary* for epistemic value. Let's consider two arguments for this claim. First, we might think that beauty is necessary for epistemic value because without beauty, scientists would have no motivation to do science, and without science, we would lose all the epistemic value that comes with science. Indeed, we know that scientists *do* find beauty motivating, especially in their search for fundamental theories, even if this sometimes holds science back (Hossenfelder 2018; Vaidyanathan and Jacobi 2022). A version of this idea is expressed by Poincaré's famous quotation: 'The scientist does not study nature because it is useful to do so. He studies it because he takes pleasure in it, and he takes pleasure in it because it is beautiful. If nature were not beautiful it would not be worth knowing, and life would not be worth living' (Poincaré 1914/2003, 22). Poincaré has a particular "intellectual" notion of beauty in mind, but however broad or narrow that conception is, few would agree that the lives of those without such experiences are not worth living. A more moderate form of this argument would be that some beauty is required for science to be the kind of thing that humans pursue. Such a view is perhaps suggested by Schellekens (2022), Ivanova (2020), and Breitenbach (2020), though I do not want to claim that any of these authors really supports a strong necessitarian view like this.

There are several ways we might respond. First, beauty is motivating, but it is not the only kind of value that motivates. The Work and Well-Being in Science project finds that while 62% of scientists were motivated to become a scientist due to considerations of beauty, this leaves 38% who were not (Vaidyanathan and Jacobi 2022). Besides beauty, scientists are motivated by the ethical good that they can achieve through science, as well as epistemic goods, like truth, knowledge, and understanding. So beauty is not necessary to motivate science. Another reply would be to consider closed-loop AI scientists, as described above, which design, perform, and interpret their own experiments. In this case, the experimental designs need not have any amount of beauty in the standard+ sense for the AI to remain "motivated". All we require is a power outlet. Thus, beauty is not necessary for epistemic value, either for humans or machines.

A second argument for the necessity claim would be that some amount of beauty is necessary for the experiment's design to be understandable, and this is one kind of epistemic value that experimental designs can have. This line of thinking is inspired by arguments made by Elgin (2020) and Ivanova (2020). For Catherine Elgin, aesthetic value can act as a gatekeeper, telling us what counts as acceptable in science. For Ivanova, our preference for beautiful things is 'deeply ingrained', such that 'taking aesthetic values in science as conditions of our cognitive makeup reflecting our intellectual interest and capacities explains why aesthetic values persist even when the best theories do not seem to quite fit our aesthetic requirements' (2020). Again, neither author states that they are arguing for the necessity of aesthetic value for epistemic value, but we can draw inspiration from them to construct such an argument.

There are several ways to respond. One is to point out that understandability is only necessary if humans are always needed to implement experimental designs. If we are talking about a closed-loop AI scientist, the kind of simplicity and clarity required for human understandability or epistemic gatekeeping is not necessary. Thus, even if some beauty is required for *human* understandability, human understandability is not required for experimental designs to have epistemic value in general, because those designs that are not understandable to humans can still be understood by machines, no matter how ugly they are. Another way to reply would be to deny that beauty is required for human understandability. After all, we can understand complicated, ugly things: we simply don't enjoy it. Finally, we might also argue that human understandability isn't the main epistemic good that scientists want experimental designs to have. In this chapter, I have focused on internal validity, which is a measure of how well an experiment identifies the nature and size of the causal effects of one variable on (an)other(s). Signs of internal validity might include a high signal-to-noise ratio, robustness to perturbation, proper isolation of the experimental system, and an established theory of the instruments used. A scientist might be able to establish that all of these are possessed by a certain experimental design, even for an experiment that is 'more like a Rube Goldberg machine' (Elgin 2020).

Pending new arguments, we can reject options 3–5 from the above list and turn to options 1 and 2, starting with 2. The claim there is that increasing aesthetic value generally *tends* to increase epistemic value. Some of the arguments presented above for the necessity claim can be weakened to support this position. For example, increasing aesthetic value generally tends to increase the motivation of scientists, which tends to increase epistemic value in science. Or, increasing aesthetic value tends to increase human understandability, which tends to increase epistemic value. In reply to each, it is important to keep in mind that the claim should not be about tending to increase epistemic value in general, but about tending to increase the epistemic value of experimental designs. (We could have made the same move in reply to the necessity version of the argument above, but it wasn't necessary.) Suppose it was part of an experiment's design to play music in the laboratory while performing the experiment. We might find that this made scientists more motivated and that might lead to more epistemic value. But it would not increase the epistemic value – at least in the sense of internal validity – of that particular experiment's design. Likewise, it might be the case that a simpler design is easier for a scientist to understand, and therefore, it might pass the gate of acceptability and scientists can easily grasp how the experiment works. But these on their own don't say much about the likeliness of that experiment to correctly identify the causal structure of a system.

Thus, we are left with the first option (independence) and a weakened version of the second option (proportionality). The second option is weakened in the sense that it would hold only for those experiments implemented by humans, and only in terms of the understandability of the design, not internal validity. With respect to the first option, things are still unclear. The reason that AI-designed experiments are ugly *and* epistemically good is due to a common cause: the nature of the algorithms involved. In this sense at least, aesthetic and epistemic value do not seem to be fully independent. But on the other hand, an experiment can be ugly and good, ugly and bad, beautiful and good, or beautiful and bad. In this (different, and perhaps more general) sense, the two different kinds of values are independent because the presence of one does not on its own tell us anything about the presence of the other.

10.5 Objections

Someone might object that AI can't "design" experiments because AI can't *do* anything, in the properly intentional sense required for human action. This might be because AI is not conscious, or because it is not connected in the right way to the objects of its "cognition". To such an objection, we can simply remove all references to AI as an active designer, and allow that AI is merely a tool, like a hammer or a paintbrush. On this presentation, we claim that when *humans* use AI to design experiments, the designs are ugly. The rest of the arguments go through as before, since we have identified an important set of experiments that are both ugly and epistemically good.[2]

Another kind of objection is really a lament: if we are headed into a future in which science has only (or mostly) ugly experiments, the world would lose an important source of beauty, and it is our duty to prevent this. To argue this way accepts the conclusion of this chapter but rejects it as repugnant. I can sympathise: a future in which all scientific experimentation was planned and carried out by AI seems somehow sad. But in reply, we can point out that such a future, however unlikely, could trade one source of beauty for others, and it is not clear that aesthetic value would decrease overall. Scientists who find aspects of experimental design work beautiful would have to move on to other pursuits; however, the new pursuits might allow for just as much beauty to be produced. And overall, a future with massively automated science might be one in which more diseases are cured, climate change is better addressed, energy and food needs are met, and so on, such that humans could lead longer, happier lives full of the production and appreciation of beauty.

Another objection would refer to human aesthetic adaptation, a feature of history fruitfully discussed by McAllister (1996). The idea is that human aesthetic values have evolved over time, and they will continue to evolve, such that the more useful AI-designed experiments come to be, the more beautiful scientists will come to find them. This accepts the premises of the argument but denies the conclusion. That is, it allows that AI-designed experiments are *currently* ugly, but claims that humans will eventually acclimatize. After all, there was more than a century of baroque art and architecture, why not again? While human aesthetic values will certainly adapt to a world increasingly suffused with AI, I think it is unlikely that future humans could change (or indeed *reverse*) their deeply ingrained preferences for simplicity, symmetry, elegance, clarity, and so on, in the way required to appreciate AI designs as beautiful in the standard+ sense. Even the most baroque art is still beautiful in that sense. Such art demands more attention to the details, and this can be challenging on first exposure. But attention reveals details that are themselves elegant, symmetrical, and so on, and the overall result is clearly pleasurable. This is not the case for designs that make no attempt whatsoever to produce something clear, simple, symmetrical, rhythmic, or united by a satisfying narrative structure. It seems unlikely that humans could adapt in the foreseeable future to find designs without such properties pleasurable.

A counterargument could be that human aesthetic values have already moved on far beyond the baroque to embrace all the diversity of contemporary art, much of which already resembles AI outputs, and that art has aesthetic value. This must be admitted. But the point of the present chapter is to challenge the claim that AI does or will design experiments that have aesthetic value *in the standard+ sense*. That is the sense with which philosophers and scientists are generally concerned, and it is not the sense with which today's artists, art critics, and aficionados are concerned. Perhaps the aesthetics of science needs an update, and we should be looking at the epistemological advantages of modernist and postmodernist aesthetic value. But that is another topic.

Finally, one might argue that if an AI were advanced enough, it might come to prefer certain strategies or develop little traditions, and experience a sense of rhythm and momentum that it could celebrate in its work. In other words, if it were a "live creature" in John Dewey's sense, then AI-designed experiments might be beautiful to the AIs themselves. We are now firmly in the realm of science fiction. But if such a future obtained, we could accept the premises but reject the conclusion of this chapter by allowing that AI-designed experiments are ugly for humans, while insisting that they have aesthetic value for *someone*, and that this aesthetic value might be connected to their epistemic value. In reply, note that AI is so useful because we can program the means to identify solution states without including aesthetic preferences. And this is one important reason that AI is able to find solutions that appear so "alien" to us (see Halina 2021). If we want AI to continue to produce useful alien solutions, either we must prevent AI from developing aesthetic values, or we must continuously build new AIs that have entirely different sets of aesthetic values from their predecessors. The second option is costly and comes with no obvious advantage, so scientists will be motivated to continue with the status quo. And in that case, AI designs will continue to be ugly to everyone who is capable of aesthetic displeasure.

10.6 Conclusion

The design of an experiment can have at least three kinds of value: ethical, epistemic, and aesthetic. These kinds of value can come apart. This chapter concerned the strength of the relationship between aesthetic and epistemic value in experimental designs: are these kinds of values independent, or does the first generally tend to increase the second, or is the first necessary or sufficient (or both) for the second? To investigate, we examined a case study of an AI-designed experiment, demonstrating that AI-designed experiments can be ugly and epistemically valuable at the same time. We can expect the use of AI in experimental design to continue to expand, and therefore this kind of ugliness should not be dismissed. Its existence puts pressure on any strong relationship postulated between aesthetic and epistemic value, since ugliness is not only acceptable in science, it can be epistemically desirable. I conclude that beauty is neither necessary nor sufficient for epistemic value, and increasing beauty will not generally tend to increase epistemic value. Whether aesthetic and epistemic values are wholly independent is an open question.

In terms of experimental design, the future might not be pretty. Nevertheless, we can expect this to help, not hinder, the achievement of science's main epistemic goals.

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Notes

1 We could also characterise ugliness not as a lack of beauty, but, following a tradition that started with Rosenkranz (1853), as its own kind of positive property. Doing so should not affect the following arguments.

2 Of course, hammers and paintbrushes change over time, and some are adorned and beautiful. But the point is that the basic functions of these tools haven't changed. Equally, user interfaces for AI algorithms in science will become easier to work with, and perhaps one day they will be beautiful. But unless the fundamental structure of AI changes, the processes and output of AI will remain ugly.

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