

# The Qualitative Study of Scientific Imagination

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Imagination is extremely important for science, yet very little is known about how scientists actually use it. Are scientists taught to imagine, and if so, when? How? What do they value imagination for? How do social and disciplinary factors shape it? How is the labor of imagining distributed? These questions should be a high priority for anyone who studies or practices science, and this article argues that the best methods for addressing them are qualitative. I then summarize a few preliminary findings derived from recent interview-based and observational qualitative studies that I have performed. These findings include the following: (a) imagination is only valued for use in addressing maximally specific problems and only when all else fails; (b) younger scientists and scientists who are members of underrepresented groups express less positive views about imagination in general and have less confidence in their own imaginations; and (c) while scientists seem to employ various epistemological frameworks to evaluate imaginings, overall they appear to be epistemic consequentialists about imagination, and this holds also for their evaluations of the tools they use to extend the power of their imaginations. I close by discussing the epistemic and ethical consequences of these findings and then suggesting a few research avenues that could be explored next as we move forward in the study of scientific imagination.

*Keywords:* qualitative methods, philosophy of science, scientific imagination, ethics of science, epistemology of science

## The Study of Imagination

The goal of this article is to motivate the qualitative study of (scientific) imagination, gather together all my own qualitative research results on scientific imagination in one place for the first time, and draw attention to exciting open research questions in the vicinity. I begin with a brief history of work on the imagination before shifting to the topic of scientific imagination in particular. Then, I argue that qualitative research

in the area is necessary, and collect the results of recent qualitative studies that I have performed on scientific imagination. I conclude by proposing some open questions.

First, I will introduce some background. The imagination is one of our most interesting, and most human, traits. It has been an important focus of study for millennia, but it has never received such prolonged and undivided scholarly attention as it is getting right now. These days, studies in psychology focus on the development of imagination in children,<sup>1</sup> subtypes of imagination such as counterfactual reasoning,<sup>2</sup> and imagination in nonhuman primates.<sup>3</sup> A search on the Journal Storage digital library turns up almost a million results on the topic, and online archives in

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<sup>1</sup> For example, Mitchell (2002), Aguiar et al. (2017), Caiman and Lundegård (2018), Lillard (1993), Harris et al. (1994), Weisberg et al. (2013).

<sup>2</sup> For example, Mandel et al. (2005), Byrne (2005).

<sup>3</sup> For example, Savage-Rumbaugh and McDonald (1988), Matsuzawa (2020), Jensvold and Fouts (1993), Mitchell (2002).

philosophy, social science, and cognitive science each locate thousands of entries with “imagination” in the title, most of which were written in the last decade.

Looking back, there are a number of recent developments that make the current emphasis on imagination seem inevitable. Here are a few (the first three are inspired by [Kind, 2018](#)):

1. The mental imagery debate of the early 1980s concerned how mental images were represented in the brain, specifically, whether this was done by imagistic or nonimagistic representations. This naturally led to a discussion of visual (and, more generally, sensory) imagination ([Arditi et al., 1988](#); [Dennett, 1981](#); [Kosslyn et al., 2006](#); [Pylyshyn, 2002](#)).
2. The publication of *Naming and Necessity* by [Kripke \(1980\)](#) refocused a large subset of philosophers working on metaphysics and language. One question it inspired is still a major topic in modal epistemology: What does our (in)ability to imagine things tell us about the (im)possibility of those things? See, for example, [Yablo \(1993\)](#), [Gendler and Hawthorne \(2002\)](#), and [Gregory \(2010\)](#).
3. Kendall Walton’s influential book *Mimesis as Make-Believe* ([Walton, 1990](#)) portrayed fictions as sets of implicit and explicit prescriptions to imagine. Since many things can fruitfully be described as fictional (including numbers, idealized physical systems, mental states, the average family), many applications outside of aesthetics have been found and explored, and this framework continues to be popular in several subdisciplines of philosophy.
4. Memory has always been an important research topic in psychology. A persistent question (at least since Hume) has been what makes something a memory as opposed to a mere imagining. Causal connectionists claim that something is a memory if the mental experience was caused (in some appropriate way) by the events that make up the content of the memory. A popular account of memory introduced by [Suddendorf and Corballis \(1997\)](#) now claims that remembering is just imagining the past. New accounts based on this idea defend a certain temporal symmetry of thought such that there is no difference between memory about the past and thinking about the future: Both are mental time travel (see, e.g., [Bulley, 2018](#); [Berg et al., 2021](#); [Klein, 2013](#); [Suddendorf, 2010](#); [Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997](#)).
5. The recent discovery of the aphantasia–hyperphantasia spectrum is revolutionizing the study of imagination ([Dawes et al., 2020](#); [Liu et al., 2023](#); [Whiteley, 2021](#); [Zeman et al., 2015, 2020](#)). This continuum ranges from those who are unable to voluntarily imagine sensory content when prompted (aphantasia) to those who are unable to prevent themselves from imagining a great deal of sensory content when prompted (hyperphantasia). The consequences of this discovery are only beginning to be unpacked.
6. Empathy plays a large role in human social life. Cognitive scientists and philosophers have all but rejected the idea that we empathize with other people by constructing theories about them, in favor of a view according to which we use imagination to simulate what other people feel and think ([Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002](#); [Morton, 2013](#); [Schmetkamp & Vendrell Ferran, 2020](#); [Sherman, 1998](#); [Stueber, 2011](#)). If correct, this puts imagination at the heart of our social lives.
7. Researchers in machine learning have attempted to code various kinds of cognitive faculties into programs designed to better approximate (or outdo) human reasoning. Some of those are specifically meant to replicate and replace human imagination ([Chandrasekharan et al., 2013](#); [Halina, 2021](#); [Stuart, 2019a](#); [Wong, 2022](#)). At the same time, we might think that imagination is the one ability that most clearly separates machines from humans.
8. The concept of social (and sociotechnical) imaginaries, introduced by C. Wright Mills in [Mills, \(1959\)](#) and refreshed in [Jasanoff & Kim, \(2009\)](#) by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, has become influential in social science and science and technology studies. An imaginary is a social structure related to imaginings of social life and order, which has been used as a lens through which to explain many things, including money, gender, race, particular technologies, nation–states, and society itself (see, e.g., [Jasanoff & Kim,](#)

2009; Mills, 1959; McNeil et al., 2017; Sismondo, 2020).

This article is about imagination *in science*. Classic studies on the topic emphasized the importance of imagination for science education (Ribot, 1906; Vico, 1730; Vygotsky, 1997), and historical work highlights the pivotal role played by imagination during major scientific revolutions (Holton, 1978, 1996; Hadamard, 1945; Jacob, 2001; Roche, 2010; Taylor, 1967). Reading through these case studies gives a strong impression that “the white heat of imagination” is woven deeply into the fabric of science’s own self-image (Taylor, 1967, pp. 4–5). But how does it work?

In recent philosophical work, scholars have discussed the different kinds of imagination present in scientific thought experiments (Arcangeli, 2010, 2017b, 2018; Meynell, 2014, 2018; Murphy, 2020; Stuart, 2017, 2021, 2022b), the role of imagination in scientific modeling (Frigg, 2010; Salis, 2020, 2021; Salis & Frigg, 2020; Toon, 2012), the role of imagination in scientific theorizing (French, 2020), and much else (see, e.g., the entries in Levy & Godfrey-Smith, 2019). Despite all this, there has been little methodological discussion on how we should go about studying the scientific imagination.

### Why We Need Qualitative Research on Scientific Imagination

Although things are changing, the preferred method of philosophers is usually to stay in the armchair. In the worst case, philosophers commit the mistake Ian Mitroff identified in 1974:

Philosophers of science do not hesitate to make all kinds of universal statements about the nature of science based on no empirical data at all, or worse yet, on the empirical data of what in their imagination they construe as the behavior of scientists. (p. 269)

A more responsible way for philosophers to avoid getting their hands dirty is to do what is sometimes called empirically informed philosophy of science. This involves building on empirical insights (usually from psychology and neuroscience) relevant to a specific philosophical issue. (For worries about how this strategy is employed in practice, see Yan & Liao, 2023). However, since there is almost no existing empirical data specifically on scientific imagination use, this kind of empirically informed philosophy of scientific imagination is presently impossible.

Nevertheless, someone interested in scientific imagination might fruitfully apply existing insights gained on nonscientific imagination to scientific imagination. Despite requiring some guesswork, this strategy can be successful. For example, Alison Gopnik has argued that scientific thinking is an expression of natural tendencies we see in children (Gopnik, 1996), so we should expect that at least some findings about childhood imagination will apply to scientific imagination. In a recent collection called *The Scientific Imagination*, three chapters were written by psychologists, and two of them draw plausible conclusions about scientific imagination from studies on children (Skolnick Weisberg, 2020; Bascandziew & Harris, 2020). The other chapter draws on studies performed on nonscientists (Lombrozo, 2020) and is equally informative.

This kind of approach might accurately predict many contours of the scientific imagination. But we should not expect it to predict all of them, as there will be facts about the scientific imagination that will be unique to the scientific context. Becoming a scientist requires long years of complex professional training and socialization, and experiences undergone during this time will have consequences for how a scientist understands, uses, evaluates, and teaches scientific imagination. Just as it would be interesting to discuss the special kinds of imagination developed by artists, judges, engineers, and architects, it is interesting to discuss the imagination of scientists.

Perhaps the most popular way to reject the need for empirical evidence in philosophy is to appeal to the nature of philosophy itself, for example, by claiming that philosophy is a purely normative enterprise whose main focus is to tell us how things should be rather than how things are. On this view, philosophers learn about truth, goodness, knowledge, beauty, meaning, existence, and so on, and with accounts of these in hand, they can produce concrete recommendations for scientists (and everyone) that will hold no matter what. As far as I know, there are not any philosophers who defend such a strong view. Still, it is important to remind ourselves to stay away from this kind of thinking by pointing out how difficult it is to say what ought to be without relying on detailed information about what is. Of course, the opposite mistake is also possible: deriving normative conclusions carelessly from descriptive information. For example, just because scientists evaluate uses of imagination in a certain

way does not mean that they (or anyone else) ought to do that. Caution is required: The goal is not to identify the norms that scientists use and then directly engrave them on stone tablets. Instead, we should seek a middle ground where bottom-up and top-down methods meet. By bottom-up I mean data-driven approaches that use empirical methods to extract the norms that govern actual scientific practice and bring them to light. By top-down I mean relatively a priori approaches. These ideally meet in the middle as scientists and philosophers analyze and improve the extracted norms, for example, by identifying and resolving conflicts between norms of imagination or between those norms and other epistemic or ethical values that scientists hold, and also by bringing to bear considerations from the a priori work.<sup>4</sup>

A different kind of objection might start from skepticism about qualitative data. For example, if qualitative research findings cannot be generalized, they cannot ground the normative claims that philosophers seek to make. However, this is a false dilemma: qualitative research can be normative even when it fails to be generalizable. Many feminist scholars, race scholars, and critical theorists, for example, use their findings explicitly to ground normative claims meant to improve the standing of groups that suffer from oppression, without feeling any need to generalize their findings to other groups, whose oppression arises or manifests itself in different ways. Combining qualitative research with activism in this way is increasingly seen as legitimate, and it can also be used to improve science, which is a social practice that is not free from oppression. Thus, nongeneralizable findings can still be used to propose new (contextually relative) best practices.<sup>5</sup>

Second, the idea that qualitative research is not generalizable needs to be qualified (Osbeck & Antczak, 2021). There are sometimes contexts in which qualitative findings can legitimately be extended to other subsets of a population or other groups. Science is one of those contexts because of its homogeneity, which is undergirded by a relatively consistent set of norms and values shared by an international community of scientists, as well as by the fact that most laboratories consist of scientists from all over the world. That is, for most things, scientists believe that there should be no difference between Malaysian science, Korean science, and Swiss science, in the sense that any cultural peculiarities, if found to be epistemically

productive, should be communicated and integrated into all other labs working on the same topic. Because of this, qualitative findings about science are often generalizable when they produce normative recommendations.

To understand scientific imagination, we must go beyond studies on nonscientists, and qualitative research methods cannot be dismissed. But which qualitative methods should be used? One possibility is historical methods, including oral history. These are useful methods, and indeed, some of the first monographs on scientific imagination employed them (Hadamard, 1945; Holton, 1978; Roche, 2010). Autobiographical notes, marginalia, correspondence, and oral history can shed light on what was happening in the minds of scientists, and this continues to be a valid and useful way to study scientific imagination.

However, it was recognized already half a century ago that some questions about science cannot be answered through the use of historical methods alone. In a two-page essay, Williams (1970) made this point concerning the disagreement between Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, writing that “the history of science cannot bear such a load [i.e., to resolve the debate about the nature and rationality of scientific revolutions] at this time” (p. 50). Instead, “the scientific community may be treated like any other community and subjected to sociological analysis. Note that this ‘may’ be done, but that it has not yet been done ... To repeat, we simply do not have this information” (p. 49). Similar calls to sociological action would be repeated soon after (e.g., Feyerabend, 1975; Mitroff, 1974) and they continue to the present day.

Nevertheless, qualitative methods are still not commonplace in the philosophy of science, and too many philosophers are tempted by what Ian Mitroff (1974) calls the “storybook” image of science that is popularized in scientific articles, textbooks, press releases, and by scientists

<sup>4</sup> Of course, in practice, bottom-up and top-down approaches rely on (and inform) one another all the way through. The point here is just to remind ourselves that a purely top-down approach would be neither effective nor complete.

<sup>5</sup> These points about normativity may seem obvious, but they are important for a practical reason: philosophers who do qualitative research often have a difficult time publishing their research in philosophical journals, as reviewers do not see the research as having any normative implications. It is therefore dismissed as mere sociology or psychology. It is good to have ready replies to such worries.

themselves (p. 9). Luckily, things are beginning to change. It has never been easier for philosophers of science to learn to use qualitative methods,<sup>6</sup> as there are more and more good exemplars to be found within the discipline (Ankeny et al., 2022; Buddle et al., 2021; Dunbar, 1995; Ivanova et al., 2023; Leonelli, 2008, 2016; Nersessian, 1992, 2008, 2022; Ritson, 2021), and many courses and workshops run by experts in the use of those methods. Moreover, old disciplinary boundaries separating the philosophy of science from rival fields in which one finds qualitative methods used (such as science and technology studies and the sociology of science) are slowly eroding. Finally, quantitative methods are growing in popularity in the philosophy of science, and this can have a gateway effect, opening avenues for the acceptance of empirical methods generally, and qualitative methods as well (for more on the history of ethnographic methods for the philosophy of science, see Nersessian & MacLeod, 2022; Nersessian, 2022, and the other entries in this special issue). With that, I conclude this survey of reasons not to use qualitative methods to learn about scientific imagination. Next, we turn to some positive reasons in favor of taking up those methods.

Imagination as a trait is highly variable and highly personal. Some people imagine very vividly, while others imagine in a more conceptual way. These differences can be hard to detect in causal conversation. To identify and explore them, qualitative interview methodology recommends getting participants to walk the interviewer through recent, past, and possible imaginings, in other words, focusing on specifics. This is complicated by the fact that voluntary sensory imagination is typically less vivid than unconscious sensory imagination (Blomkvist, 2023), so it is often difficult or impossible to recreate voluntarily in the mind what earlier appeared by means of more vivid subconscious imaginings. In addition, memory is less than fully trustworthy. Thus, no matter how good interview data are, they are likely not enough.

For this reason, interview data should be combined with field observations in order to triangulate, test, and expand on interview findings. However, this creates a new problem, namely, that of identifying the uses of imagination in social settings without assuming a specific definition of imagination on the participants' behalf. Of course, this is a common problem for

qualitative researchers, who often need to bootstrap themselves up to an analytically useful conceptual height from their starting point. The key is open-ended inquiry that stays flexible: Research questions, themes, codes, and hypotheses that appear useful today might have to change tomorrow. This is why qualitative methods are currently more appropriate than quantitative methods for scientific imagination: While surveys could be sent out to thousands of scientists, good answers only come from good questions, and it is not yet clear which are the good questions. The best starting point, given that we are still very much at the beginning, is open-ended qualitative inquiry. Only this kind of methodology is able to extract the types, features, and uses of imagination used by scientists, which are still unknown to researchers.

In sum, we have an interesting context of imagination use, science, and we do not yet have empirical data about how imagination is used in that context. Until such data is obtained, we can only go so far in our study of the topic. Motivated by this, starting in 2015, I performed a number of qualitative studies whose findings will be outlined below. Those findings were not meant to support or disprove any specific claims made in the philosophical or psychological literature; they were merely the product of an attempt to identify patterns concerning the nature, function, distribution, ethics, and epistemology of scientific imagination.

## Methodology

The work began with a pilot study (Study 1). Five participants were selected from two biology labs. One lab engaged in computational systems biology, while the other was an experimental biology lab. Lab members came and went, but each lab employed roughly 7–10 members at any given time. Observations and interviews were performed over the course of a semester, between January 2016 and April 2016. Two semistructured, hour-long interviews were performed with each of the five selected participants, with short follow-up discussions after the end of the study. Around 10 hr of interviews were recorded and transcribed, as

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<sup>6</sup> By this term I mean ethnographic methods, including interview methods and participant observations. There are many other methods that may go by the name qualitative, including discourse analysis, narrative analysis, and phenomenology.

well as more than 20 hr of observational data from lab meetings, colloquia, and informal events.

A grounded theory approach was chosen for coding and analysis, at least partially because, as I mentioned above, the main concept at issue (imagination) does not have anything like a settled definition in the literature, and it seemed wise to allow definitions for this term (and related terms) to emerge from the study itself. It was not a pure grounded theory study, however, as some hypotheses were formulated in advance, consistent with analytic induction. All hypotheses, whether they emerged during the study or were preformulated, were tested against coded transcripts of the audio recordings of interviews, field observations, and in follow-up interviews.

From the beginning, it was assumed that scientists would find it sensible to talk about imagination as a faculty or cognitive process, and that they would agree that it plays some role in science. It was also assumed that some scientists might not be very willing to discuss imagination, as it can be seen to clash with the popular image of science as cold, emotionless, and directed purely towards the truth (McAllister, 2012). Because of this last assumption, no mention was made of imagination to the participants of Study 1 until toward the end of the last interview. In general, the studies attempted to instantiate what Nancy Nersessian calls “cognitive ethnography,” which characterizes scientific laboratories as cognitive-cultural communities with epistemic goals, whose histories are important for understanding them (see, e.g., Nersessian, 2022). It entails analyzing not just the individual scientists and their behavior but their ongoing historical relations to each other and their environments and tools.

For each participant, the first interview covered relevant personal and academic history and finished with an overview of the current problems they were working on, and the methods they employed to tackle them. The second and follow-up interviews inquired into the daily cognitive work of the scientists, focusing on their reasoning connected with problem choice, model building, experimentation, data interpretation, visualization, and paper writing. Questions were then asked about the roles of mathematical reasoning, emotion, humor, and imagination. A total of 173 individual codes emerged during the coding process, and these were arranged into 12 higher

level themes (emotion, practice, problems, pedagogy, socialization, methodological considerations, personal details, important events, cognitive processes, modeling, visualization, and imagination). Rough connections between the codes were hypothesized to explain the data, which were tested in follow-up interviews (for more information, see Stuart, 2019a).

The next study (Study 2) was limited mostly to interview protocols. In some cases this was because the scientists worked in institutions where lab visits were difficult or impossible, but in most cases, it was because worldwide lockdowns in response to COVID-19 caused several labs to cease their in-person work entirely during the period under study. One lab was a genetics lab, and two were climate science labs. There were additionally one physicist participant, one mathematician participant, and one space scientist. Interviews took place between 2018 and 2022. An important purpose of Study 2 was to investigate which insights (if any) from Study 1 could be generalized, as well as to get a broader view of scientific imagination by looking at different fields of science.

### **Lessons Learned About Scientific Imagination**

I will now present some findings based on the above research. These concern the function, distribution, evaluation, and empowerment of imagination. The following mostly summarizes what is discussed in greater detail elsewhere; however, general themes will be pointed out for the first time here, for example, that most of the norms extracted which govern the use of scientific imagination seem to discourage or limit the use of imagination rather severely. The purpose is to showcase recent work at the intersection of philosophy of science and qualitative methodology with the hope that it might spark interest in others.

#### **The Function of Scientific Imagination**

One outcome of Study 1 was that imagination is not universally approved of in science. For example, imagination used for its own sake, as in daydreaming or fantasizing, is generally frowned upon. The only context in which imagination is universally celebrated is in problem solving. This was confirmed by the interviews conducted in

Study 2.<sup>7</sup> What is interesting, however, is that the kinds of problems scientists claimed to use imagination to address were not actually the problems they used imagination for. For example, scientists in Study 1 claimed that imagination was important for tackling big issues, like understanding how cells make sense of their environments, how to advance cell microscopy, and how to apply insights concerning variable cell responses for medical use. In practice, these questions were not the ones imagination was used to address, because in practice, scientists do not actually attempt to solve such problems in their daily work. Of course, imagination could be used to think up solutions to big problems like these, but if anything like this actually happened, for example, in a lab meeting, scientists would almost immediately be encouraged to refocus on more specific versions of these big problems. Rather than how to cure cancer, they focus on how to deal with a lack of fit between a particular computer model's outputs and some experimental data. In addition, imagination was never used to generate or probe possible solutions to any problem except as a last resort, when all other methods had been tried and had failed to produce solutions. In sum, the following norm appears to govern imagination use in science: only use imagination for addressing maximally specific problems and only when all else fails (Stuart, 2019b).

There are epistemological considerations in favor of this norm. For one, the human imagination is not very useful when it comes to exploring systems with many variables (Cowan, 2001). It just does not have the computing power. By whittling down a problem into a maximally specific version, scientists eliminate potentially confounding variables one by one. They are not explicitly trying to make the problem more tractable for the imagination, but in effect, that is what happens. A second reason in favor of this norm is that the more specific a problem becomes, the more background knowledge is brought to bear, which means there are more constraints on the imagination. Most authors in the literature on imagination agree that constraints are necessary for the imagination to produce new knowledge, and the more constraints, the better (see, e.g., the entries in Kind & Kung, 2016; for a counterargument, see Stuart, 2020).

However, the norm also has some potential downsides. The most obvious is that it discourages the use of imagination in questioning established

scientific dogma. Of course, some amount of conservativeness is good, and no one would suggest that scientists should spend all their time questioning dogma: this would not be practical or fruitful. Still, a consequence of this norm might be an undesirable overconstraining of the imagination that might lead to it being underused, which is relevant because all principal investigators interviewed agreed that among their students, overconstrained imaginations were much more common than overactive ones. That is a bad thing: We want imaginations that are in between weak and overactive, and it appears that current science education mostly presents itself as an obstacle to the development of imagination at the undergraduate and graduate levels.

### Who Gets to Imagine?

Another outcome of Study 1 was that attitudes about the importance of mathematical reasoning (very important but neglected in biology), humor (socially very important but scientifically unimportant), and emotion (important for motivation but not valid in scientific reasoning) were extremely consistent among participants, but attitudes toward the importance of imagination varied, in a consistent way: younger scientists and scientists who were members of underrepresented groups (including women, certain ethnic minorities, differently abled, or neurodivergent people) expressed less positive, or even negative, views about the usefulness of imagination in science, and they also tended to express negative views about the strength and usefulness of their own imaginations. As a result, such scientists might try to avoid imaginative tasks or offload them to scientists who were later in their careers or who were members of more privileged groups.

This situation has negative ethical and epistemic consequences for science (outlined in Stuart & Sargeant, 2024), including pushing more imaginative people out of science, reducing the diversity of imaginative perspectives in science, and again contributing to conservativeness. This finding was confirmed by Study 2 participants.

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<sup>7</sup> Nersessian's guidelines for cognitive ethnography include a recommendation to focus on the problem-solving practices of a laboratory. While this recommendation is backed up by Nersessian's own research (not to mention being a priori plausible), it was not assumed that problem solving would be the context in which scientists explicitly approved of imagination use. That they did is a point in favor of Nersessian's framework.

There are several possible explanations for this situation. One is that young scientists and those from traditionally marginalized groups face additional pressure, whether due to targeted or systemic oppression, that creates a feeling of otherness, which can motivate them to leave science, or otherwise feel they must prove themselves by developing prowess in more “hardcore” or “respectable” tasks, for example, those that require experimental, mathematical, or computational ability. But by doing this, those scientists risk siloing themselves away from the imaginative work they might otherwise be doing, and from developing confidence in the use of their imaginations.

Another explanation for this finding is that science education (especially at the undergraduate level) does not teach students that imagination is a sanctioned—and *important*—part of the scientific method, or how to use it. This is something early-career scientists must learn through experience. However, scientists from more vulnerable groups tend to have less access to personal mentorship and networking opportunities, and as a result, they are not made aware of the validity and importance of imagination in science via mentorship. On the other hand, well-established scientists, especially those in overrepresented groups, praise imagination in general and their own imaginations in particular, going so far as to attribute major successes to the power of the imagination.

To be clear, nothing malevolent was observed in any of the lab meetings or during any of the interviews. It seems likely that this kind of imagination avoidance results from structural features of the way that modern science is taught and organized (Özdemir, 2009). Thus, structural solutions are required. For some proposals in that direction, see Stuart and Sargeant (2024b).

### What Counts as a Good Scientific Imagining?

Study 2 participants were asked to provide examples of imaginings that they considered good and imaginings they considered bad and to explain the difference. One interesting pattern in their answers was that how a scientist defined good and bad depended on when the imagining was posited to take place in time (Stuart, 2022a), that is, whether the imagining in question was located in the past, present, or future.

Imaginings in the past were explained as being good or bad because of the good or bad consequences of those imaginings. Good consequences included

new discoveries or new applications of techniques or clever adaptations of instruments/methodologies from outside the lab. Bad consequences included wasted time and resources.

Imaginings in the present, for example, in the context of an ongoing attempt to solve an open problem, are judged to be good or bad if they are properly (i.e., responsibly) constrained, to the best of the scientist’s ability. At first, a scientist will want to obey all possible constraints, like representational accuracy and consistency with background knowledge. But when that does not work, some constraints must be broken. In such cases, the operative norm seems to be as follows: break the minimal number of constraints possible, and always start with the constraints in which the scientist has the least confidence. If this does not work, higher confidence (e.g., more deeply embedded) constraints can be broken, again, one by one. Imagining in this way is thought to be a responsible way to proceed (Stuart & Sargeant, 2024a).

If the time index changes to the future, for example, by focusing on how a scientist would want themselves to imagine in the context of addressing a future problem, they switch from speaking about good and bad imaginings to speaking about good and bad *imaginings*. To develop a good imagination, techniques should be used to empower the imagination, for example, by increasing the size and quality of the experience base from which the imagination draws, having good colleagues to discuss ideas with, and being in the right kind of physical environment. In these cases, imagination is thought of more like a skill or character trait.

These different ways of evaluating acts of imagination suggest a kind of epistemological pluralism, such that there are different senses of good that imaginings can instantiate. However, it appears that scientists ground all their evaluations in good and bad consequences. Thus, the rules they recommend, like breaking constraints one by one, are justified in terms of their expected good consequences. Likewise, increasing the power of imagination in general is also valued for its expected good consequences.

It is no accident that the kinds of justifications scientists give roughly correspond to the three most popular theories of the nature of justification in philosophy: epistemic consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. I did not have these frameworks in mind when analyzing the transcripts of interviews, but as a



philosopher, I was aware of them. Still, I was not expecting to find all three used, nor that they would each be associated with a different time index, nor that consequentialism would be the foundational type of epistemic justification for the scientists (Stuart, 2022a).

### **Tools of the Imagination**

Some philosophers have recently begun discussing scientific tools as things which encode knowledge in themselves (Baird, 2004) or which assist scientists in reasoning about one system by means of another (Carrillo & Knuuttila, 2021; de Oliveira, 2022; Knuuttila, 2011, 2021). While it is clear in general that scientists use tools to extend the power of their hands and minds, there are also tools that extend the power of the imagination. More specifically, if a tool is something that provides impetus, direction, or focus to an action, then certainly thought experiments, computer simulations, models, visualizations, artificial intelligence, and metaphors can be thought of as tools that direct and focus the scientific imagination in useful ways (Stuart, 2022b). Not all of these is always a tool of the imagination, and many other things not listed (like formal languages, analogies, and jokes) could count as tools of imagination. In any case, one important question is, for any given tool of the imagination, how is it best designed, used, and evaluated?

Adopting the tripartite framework described in the previous section, we can identify tools whose consequences on given acts of imagination are known with relative certainty (because they were used in the past and we know what their effects were), tools whose consequences on given acts of imagination are not known but can be guessed with some confidence (these are tools that are recommended today for use on problems whose solutions are not known, because they have worked in the past on similar problems), and tools whose consequences on given acts of imagination are not known and cannot be guessed (these are tools that might be used to train the next generation of scientists, but which may or may not be helpful in solving any specific problem). In the first scenario, a straightforward evaluation of consequences is possible, and this is what scientists do. In the second scenario, certain tools are recommended for use because scientists feel they can safely assume that those tools will guide the imagination in a fruitful direction,

though they cannot know for certain whether their application will yield positive results in any particular case without having already tried it. In the third scenario, certain tools are recommended for use because scientists feel they will be helpful for future scientists in general as training exercises for the imagination, whether or not they are useful as particular problem-solving tools (Stuart, 2022b).

### **Varia**

It was noted that there are two opposite reactions scientists can have in response to discussions about imagination. Both of these stem from the fact that imagination is not an “official” component of the scientific method. This means that scientists do not have shared standards for when it is used, or how to use it, or teach it. Interestingly, this lack of standardization either frustrates or excites scientists. Some want standards for each part of their work. But when it comes to imagination, they find none, and this generates feelings of frustration. A similar issue arises, not with standardization but with transparency. Scientists tend to believe that each step in their method should be available to inspection, calibration, and verification. The workings of imagination are not transparent. Try though they might, they cannot say for certain what is happening when they imagine. This is another source of epistemic agony. On the contrary, there is a certain subset of participants, typically those with backgrounds or interest in art or the humanities, who believe that this mysterious lawlessness of the imagination is something to be celebrated, something that makes science exciting and human and worth doing.

### **Roads Not yet Traveled**

There are many questions, both new and old, that remain to be answered. I will briefly hint at some of these here.

The first set of issues concerns the nature of scientific imagination. There are several taxonomies of kinds of imagination we might look to (Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Strawson, 1971; Stevenson, 2003; Stuart, 2021; Van Leeuwen, 2013, 2014; Walton, 1990) and one that specifically concerns scientific imagination (Salis and Frigg, 2020). But these are almost entirely based on historical, anecdotal, or introspective evidence. Qualitative methods are capable of bringing new

and different notions of scientific imagination to light. Overall, what is desired is a taxonomic map of scientific imagination, which displays where to find the different kinds of imagination in science and what the different kinds of imagination are used for. The end goal would be to combine this with similar maps for nonscientific disciplines, for example, imagination in art, humanities, law, business, etc. Such an achievement would go a long way toward capturing what imagination is.

A necessary step along the way would be to consider the relations between imagination and similar cognitive processes that have been discussed in philosophy, for example, supposition, conception, and creativity (Arcangeli, 2017a; Jackson, 2016; Sánchez-Dorado, 2020; Stokes, 2014). For example, supposition, on some accounts, is “colder” than imagination. That is, some claim that it is easy to *suppose* that something horrible happened for the sake of argument, while it is painful or repulsive to *imagine* the same thing. On some accounts, supposition is completely different from imagination, and for others, supposition is a kind of imagination. Do scientists also differentiate between these processes? Do they employ them both, and if so, are there differences in the contexts in which they are deployed, and if so, why? Further, for some scientists, imagination seems to be coextensive with creativity. But is creativity also coextensive with supposition? Qualitative methods might not force philosophers to (re)define their terms in particular ways, but it can productively inform the discussion.

The second set of issues concerns various ways of extending our focus beyond the individual. Social epistemology is a field of philosophy that starts by questioning epistemology’s exclusive focus on the epistemic state of the individual, and insists instead on the value of considering how groups and members of groups gain knowledge (for a recent overview, see O’Connor et al., 2023). Some main topics of focus within this movement have been whether groups themselves can have beliefs that none of the members have, whether they can have a special kind of knowledge or justification, and how groups might best be arranged to promote the achievement of epistemic ends. The idea would be to adopt this framework and apply it to scientific imagination, perhaps as a way to criticize, complexify, or support existing ideas in that literature or simply to gain a better grasp of the social aspect of scientific imagination. In a similar vein, there are

literatures on extended and distributed cognition, which argue that epistemology should not stop at the end of the brainstem, or even at the body, but also focus on the tools we use to think (see, e.g., Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Menary, 2007, for extended cognition and Hutchins, 1996, for distributed cognition). Again, the focus of this literature has traditionally not been on imagination, but attempting to transfer these frameworks and their insights could certainly be fruitful.

Scientists sometimes imagine individually, for example, on their own while waiting for a breakthrough. But based on the empirical data collected in Studies 1 and 2, the work of the imagination was often most productive in group settings, and in combination with external representation devices (computers, white boards, pen and paper, etc.). This suggests a social and distributed view of imagination.

The distribution and extension of imagination from the individual to the greater laboratory context makes sense and is consistent with Nersessian’s analytic orientation toward cognitive ethnography that she calls distributed cognition, according to which cognition in science should be analyzed at the level of the entire laboratory, in terms of individual and group cognition, but also with a focus on representational tools (both inside and outside the mind) (see, e.g., Nersessian, 2022, especially Chapters 1 and 2). This framework could helpfully explain how scientists supercharge their imaginations by running them in parallel with others and with their devices. Much more can and should be said about how this works.

Two wrinkles are interesting to note here. Scientists say that certain kinds of problems were best addressed using imagination by oneself, while others were better addressed in group settings (Stuart, 2019b). Why might this be? Perhaps the kinds of questions best addressed alone were those where the scientist is confident that they only need a little imagination to solve, and therefore external help is not necessary. Or perhaps it is the nature of certain problems that collaboration confuses or distracts. More research is necessary here. Second, scientists claimed that their most imaginative moments came neither alone nor in the lab, but at conferences, in the times between talks while discussing in small groups. They claimed this often happened when the talks they attended had little or nothing to do with their own research. It is possible that this could be explained simply by appealing to the

general truism that exposure to different ideas, methods, and frameworks can open the mind to new possibilities. Or it could be that listening to irrelevant talks gives the scientist just enough distraction to activate some kind of unconscious imagination: roughly, that our conscious mind sets up a question and the unconscious mind suggests answers but only when distracted to the right degree. But again, it would be interesting to explore this phenomenon further. For example, does the inspirational power of such group discussions depend on the conceptual distance between the topic of the talk and the research area of the scientist and their discussion mates? If so, what is the ideal conceptual distance? Does this kind of inspiration tend to happen at specific junctures in the trajectory of problem solving, and if so, which, and why?

A third set of issues emerges when trying to apply findings about imagination in nonscientists to the study of scientific imagination. We said above that certain extensions can be made with some confidence. For example, one interesting discovery already mentioned is the aphantasia–hyperphantasia spectrum. Surely, some scientists will be aphantasics, that is, they will not be able to voluntarily call to mind sensory content. But how many scientists are aphantasics, and how does it affect their work? In an interview with a mathematician, I was told that there is a split in mathematical imagination styles that cleaves the discipline in two: Half of all mathematicians explore questions in a visual way, while the other half employ nonvisual, conceptual thinking. This creates difficulty for both sides in communicating and discussing their results. Is it possible that the nonsensory half of mathematicians experience some form of aphantasia? That would be surprising, as the general prevalence of aphantasia in humans is currently thought to be only 2%–3% (Faw, 2009; Zeman et al., 2020). However, recent work employing quantitative methods suggests that 16% (of a small sample of biologists) described themselves as fully aphantasic and 35% as aphantasic to some degree (McLoone et al., 2023). This raises the general question of the prevalence of aphantasia among scientists and across scientific disciplines. It would be very interesting to know why certain disciplines have more aphantasics than others, if they do, and how the content or methods of those disciplines explains or is predicted by that prevalence.

Another phenomenon found in nonscientists that can be assumed to exist in science is called

imaginative resistance. This is the felt inability to imagine certain things. Several competing accounts of the phenomenon exist. For example, perhaps people cannot imagine something because they cannot find a way to make sense of it, or because it contains a hidden contradiction, or because it is very unusual, or because they find it morally distasteful and fear it will contaminate them (see, e.g., Black & Barnes, 2020; Barnes & Black, 2016; Gendler, 2000; Kim et al., 2018; Liao, 2016; Liao et al., 2014; Stueber, 2011; Weatherson, 2004). So far, there is very little research on this phenomenon in science (though see Savojarjo, 2022). It would be very interesting to perform a qualitative study about when and why imaginative resistance occurs in science, if it does. Savojarjo considers the possibility of situations in which previous background assumptions clash with new hypotheses, thus generating imaginative resistance. This is certainly an interesting place to start looking for the phenomenon.

A fourth set of issues concerns the downstream ethical consequences of imagination's use and distribution in science. For instance, lack of ethical foresight might be best characterized in terms of failures to exercise moral imagination. In a recent book called *Science and the Moral Imagination*, Brown (2020) claims exactly this, that scientists and engineers ought to investigate the ethics of their practice carefully, and that exercising their moral imagination is key to ensuring that their scientific outputs have ethically good consequences. Qualitative methods could be very useful in analyzing how the moral imagination of scientists is currently trained, evaluated, and conceived in science, to extract further norms for its use and provide additional recommendations for best practices.

There is also an important unanswered question about the epistemology of scientific imagination. Above, we saw that scientists are very concerned with the consequences of their imaginings. But what makes a consequence epistemically good? One family of options is to characterize consequences in terms of mental states. Thus, an imagining is good for an individual scientist if, other things being equal, it increases the number of true beliefs that individual has. Or perhaps we want to increase the amount of knowledge the individual has or understanding. Another possibility is to consider the consequences of imaginings for groups of scientists. Perhaps groups cannot have mental

states like beliefs, but it seems possible to evaluate the consequences of imaginings as good or bad for the collective. A third family of options would be to understand good consequences not in terms of epistemic states (like true belief or knowledge) but in terms of scientific problem-solving abilities. Thus, an imagining can open up new ways of solving particular problems, and they can be good in that sense, even if they do not produce new true beliefs. This is an open question and a very important one in current discussions of the epistemology of science. Qualitative data on this question is sorely needed.

A final set of issues concerns the pursuit of other analytic frameworks for investigating scientific imagination. For example, the abovementioned studies mostly focused on imagination as something done primarily with the mind, not the body. But embodied accounts of cognition suggest that this only tells part of the story (Vázquez et al., 2023; Rucińska & Gallagher, 2021). Qualitative studies focusing specifically on the embodied component of imagination would be very interesting. A still different analytic framework would be one inspired by the growing corpus of work on the logic of imagination (see, e.g., Berto, 2017, 2022; Canavotto et al., 2022; Casas-Roma et al., 2021). Specifically, it would be illuminating to see which valid or cogent reasoning schemas could be extracted from the imaginative reasoning processes of scientists and representing these logically. Doing so would open up new possibilities for normative accounts of scientific imagination, as well as for encoding imagination in computers. Finally, a more technocentric framework could be employed. This might focus on computational methods as replacing certain imaginative tasks (Chandrasekharan et al., 2013; Shinod, 2021; Stuart, 2019a). For example, there are already algorithms responsible for designing, performing, and interpreting experiments (Stuart, 2023), which are traditionally thought of (at least partially) as acts of imagination. How will the introduction of artificial intelligence and big data change scientific imagination? This is something to keep an eye on.

### Conclusion

Science is an extremely complex set of practices. Qualitative approaches celebrate complexity, and this gives them an advantage when it

comes to understanding what science is, how it is done, why it succeeds, and how it can be improved.

Cognitive ethnographic methods have now yielded insights into the nature and function of scientific imagination, which could not have been found otherwise. This may be considered as a proof of concept, not for cognitive ethnography, which is already well-motivated, but for the application of cognitive ethnographic methods to specific cognitive processes like imagination in science.

In particular, this article has presented some early findings on scientific imagination that profited from the use of qualitative methods, including that imagination is valued for its problem-solving power and that it is approved for use only in attempting to solve maximally specific problems for which the usual methods have already failed. We saw that different scientists have different views about the importance of imagination for science in general and about the strengths of their own imaginations, and these attitudes varied in a consistent way: Scientists who were earlier in their careers or members of traditionally underrepresented groups tended to avoid imagination and focus on more traditionally valued scientific abilities, often outsourcing work that requires imagination to others. There are important negative ethical and epistemic effects of this situation. Finally, we also saw that while scientists sometimes employ evaluative frameworks such as deontic or virtue theoretic epistemology, they seem to be best described as epistemological consequentialists when it comes to the imagination and the tools that empower imagination.

We closed with six sets of open issues, concerning (a) the nature of scientific imagination, (b) social and embodied imagination, (c) so-called imaginative resistance in science, (d) other downstream ethical consequences of how imagination is organized and used in science, (e) further explorations of what grounds consequentialist evaluations of imagination, and (f) other possible lenses through which to perform qualitative research on scientific imagination.

All the arguments in this article would likely also motivate using qualitative methods to study other cognitive-cultural processes and properties, including creativity, beauty, humor, and emotion in science. We have much to look forward to as the use of qualitative methods in the study of science increases.

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